Foreword: The Future of the Profession by Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2000
Foreword: The Future of the Profession
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
UC Hastings College of the Law, hazardg@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (2000).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/975
Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Author: Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
Title: Foreword: The Future of the Profession
Source: Minnesota Law Review
Citation: 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (2000).
Originally published in MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW. This article is reprinted with permission 
from MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW and University of Minnesota Law School.
Hazard, Jr. Geoffrey
Foreword: The Future of the Profession
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.t
INTRODUCTION
The following are my views of the multidisciplinary prac-
tice (MDP) problem and how the American Bar Association
(ABA) and, more generally, the legal profession should respond
to it. I want to emphasize that these are my views. They do
not necessarily and probably will not, in fact, correspond with
the views of the ABA MDP Commission. The Commission is
made up of a large number of people with diverse views and
backgrounds and different approaches to the subject, to say
nothing of diverse views on many other subjects. Moreover
there are other participants in this symposium, who are as well
informed on this subject as I am, and who have somewhat dif-
ferent views as to various aspects of it.
I come at this subject considering myself to be a practicing
lawyer, which I am, and have been for the last twenty years. I
was introduced into the law in the capacity of an associate at a
general practice law firm. I have never been a judicial clerk, a
fact that, I think, has influenced my take on the law ever since.
As an associate you start at the bottom trying to make the sys-
tem come out in a way that is consistent with your clients' in-
terest. The person you are working for in a law office does not
have the awesome power that reposes in the courts. I still con-
sider myself a lawyer. I do legal work, and I think I think like
a lawyer as well as an academic. I care a great deal about the
legal profession, and I have always tried to consider its best in-
terests.
I will begin with my conclusions about what the ABA and
the state bars ought to do now. I offer these conclusions be-
cause I think many lawyers are predisposed to do something ill-
advised, going on stupid. What I think they ought to do is ei-
t Trustee Professor Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Direc-
tor Emeritus, American Law Institute; Member, American Bar Association
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice.
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ther not change the rules at all or else change the rules in a
way that would facilitate bringing into the recognized profes-
sion those lawyers presently engaged in occupations that call
on their technical training in law but who work in settings in
which, in this country and some other countries abroad, it is
unlawful for them to call themselves lawyers, or in which it
would work serious inconvenience to their employers if they
were to call themselves lawyers. Therefore, these technicians
call themselves tax specialists or consultants or something else,
but they do not call themselves lawyers. I think it is a mistake
to keep them outside the law's professional tent. Hence, if any
modification in the rules is to be made, I would modify the rules
to permit them to come into the tent. However, if we are not
going to modify the rules in that direction, I would recommend
that the rules be left alone. Let the forces of competition, which
are blowing very hard these days, produce whatever may come.
I think it is foolish to try to resist the forces of this magnitude
with what will be relatively ineffectual legal controls.
The salient actors embodying these market forces have
been the big accounting firms. The Big Five are no longer sim-
ply accounting firms. They are big, multidisciplinary profes-
sional service organizations, including not only accounting but
management information services, financial services, manage-
ment consulting, environmental consulting, and still other spe-
cialized functions. They are seeking to offer the efficiencies of
faster and more sophisticated communication, quicker and
more effective integration of various specialties, and the advan-
tage of offering various services under a common name and
with a common reputation. At a fundamental level, the driving
market force is increased efficiency in transmitting informa-
tion. The Big Five are big organizations, having tens of thou-
sands of employees, whereas the biggest law firm has fewer
than 10,000 employees and fewer than 3,000 lawyers.
In contemplating the MDP issue, we naturally think first
of the big accounting firms. However, there is a multitude of
other entities that are responding to the same underlying mar-
ket forces. We should include the management advisory firms
that are now competing with the accounting firms. We should
include the big banks that are managing huge amounts of
money, in all different kinds of ways-money market accounts,
securities trading, loans and other investments, and now in-
surance. We should include the insurance companies, which
are themselves branching into other fields, for example
1084 [Vol. 84:1083
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healthcare financing and management. We should include in-
vestment and securities companies, some of which have merged
with or been merged into banks and insurance companies.
None of these companies can operate without a large internal
corps of lawyers. Of course, these lawyers are serving the en-
tity by which they are employed and thus are not engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law. But the work these lawyers
do establishes the legal framework for the transactions with
their employers' clientele. In that sense, the corporate legal
staffs are providing legal services to the outside clientele.
We should also include the information companies associ-
ated with the term Silicon Valley and epitomized by Microsoft.
The businesses of these companies absolutely depend on some
legally defensible, or at least legally arguable, definitions of in-
tellectual property. Intellectual property is a legal concept and
requires lawyers to articulate and enforce the concept. Finally,
we should include organizations like the University of Pennsyl-
vania Medical Center, which is a huge enterprise enmeshed in
a complex web of legal regulations. The regulations to which a
modern hospital is subject come forth in relentless streams and
require large legal staffs to read, review and interpret to the
doctors, the hospital administrators and, at least secondarily,
to the patients. All of these entities must have a lot of lawyers
just to open the door tomorrow morning.
I. THE CURRENT RULES
A. WHAT IS LEGAL?
Before we become too involved in the MDP debate, let me
define what I think is now legal and illegal under the Model
Rules as they stand. What I think is legal is this: If a firm, let
us call it Pricewaterhouse, so desired, it could have a letterhead
with its name on the upper left-hand corner, and on the right-
hand corner it could have the name of Sullivan & Cromwell
with the subscript "LC" (legal counsel) under the firm's name.
It could have the same designation on its brochures. (A firm of
nonlawyers can advertise the identity of their law firm.) There
could be a contract arrangement between Pricewaterhouse and
Sullivan & Cromwell under which the law firm provides legal
advice to Pricewaterhouse. The agreement would also provide
that when the clientele of Pricewaterhouse might have need of
legal assistance, the clients would ordinarily be referred to
Sullivan & Cromwell. The client, obviously, has to consent to a
20001 1085
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referral and would retain the right to engage any other law
firm for any matter. Pricewaterhouse has to want to send the
client there rather than sending it across the street or some-
where else, and Sullivan & Cromwell has to be willing to take
the client. Under this kind of separate arrangement, each en-
tity sends separate bills to the client, Pricewaterhouse for
whatever it is doing and Sullivan & Cromwell for whatever it is
doing. As the rules currently stand, there would be nothing
unethical or improper with this arrangement.
As a matter of fact, that is exactly what Ernst & Young has
established in the District of Columbia with the firm McKee &
Nelson, except that the law firm is called McKee Nelson Ernst
& Young. The names of people who were not lawyers have
been tacked on pursuant to a rule in the District of Columbia
that permits a law firm to use a trade name. Thus, lawyers
have the trade name as a subscript to their identification, and
Ernst & Young has held out their affiliation with the law firm.
I have it from a reliable source that Ernst & Young chose to in-
clude their name in the firm's name in defiance of the organ-
ized bar, challenging the bar to try to suppress the arrange-
ment. There was an additional reason they wanted to include
Ernst & Young in the firm name-that designation permitted
the accountants to advertise the relationship particularly to
their European clients, in effect saying that they had special
access to super American tax lawyers who will be able to help
out. Under the current rules, at least in the District of Colum-
bia, there is nothing wrong with including Ernst & Young in
the firm's name.
There is a simpler variation of these arrangements that
was presented to the Commission in testimony from various
witnesses. It is one you could visualize in Bemidji or Rochester,
for example. There is an office building with an entryway
leading to a reception center for professional offices. If you en-
ter the reception area and look to the left over a doorway, it
says Smith & Jones, Lawyers. If you look to the right over a
doorway, it says Black & White, Accountants. You can walk in
and engage whichever service seems appropriate. To comply
with current rules, the firms operate as parallel organizations,
each with their own name, staff, suite, record-keeping and
billing system. The two firms coordinate their services very
closely and cross-refer clients. Essentially, the operation con-
sidered as a whole is a multidisciplinary service, run as two
separate firms.
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The arrangement is especially advantageous to the law
firm. Clients of the accountants have very cordial relations
with members of that firm and usually would accept referral
recommendations. Also, the business clients of the accounting
firm come in at least every three months in connection with
their tax returns. That creates other possibilities for referral of
legal matters that might otherwise fall by the wayside.
Many attorneys see the connection between accountants
and their clients as a pathway by which the law firm across the
hall could get additional business on mutually favorable terms.
The terms are more favorable to the law firm because addi-
tional business is involved, and more favorable for the account-
ant because the accountant does not have to take the risk of
giving advice that should be coming from a lawyer. The terms
are more favorable for the client because less tension and anxi-
ety is involved in dealing with a lawyer introduced by an in-
termediary with whom the client has had a continuing and
positive relationship. Many people find it a very terrifying ex-
perience to deal with lawyers. Some people would say that we
train ourselves to be terrifying so we can stand up to the other
side when we get in court. In any event, the fact is that law-
yers as a class are not the world's greatest at public relations
and many are not good at establishing positive human rela-
tions. The relationship of accountant and client, on the other
hand, is more relaxed and supportive from the client's view-
point.
There are of course all kinds of ethical problems implicated
with this arrangement. Was this the best lawyer available to
be recommended to the client? Should a specialist be con-
sulted? Is there a problem of keeping matters confidential?
What about the attorney-client privilege? Undoubtedly, those
problems and others would arise. However, problems of this
sort are not much different from the problems that exist in or-
dinary practice today. If the participants pay attention, the
problems can be identified and resolved.
If the rules stay as they are, I predict that similar ar-
rangements will proliferate. I do not think the result will be
disappearance of the "traditional" law firm. The traditional
law firm, where everyone is a lawyer and nothing else, has a lot
going for it, particularly in dealing with especially difficult
transactions and litigation. At the same time, I doubt very
much that the bar could succeed in achieving adoption of rules
that would prohibit arrangements of the kind I have described.
2000] 1087
HeinOnline -- 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1087 1999-2000
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The real question is, therefore, whether the rules should be
changed to facilitate anything beyond this.
B. WHAT IS ILLEGAL?
Under the current rules, two matters of conduct relevant to
the MDP debate are involved. The first is prohibition of fee
sharing with nonlawyers, provided by Rule 5.4 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. The second is imputation of
conflicts from one professional to another, governed by Rule
1.10.
The question of fee sharing is, I think, a non-issue. Every
law firm today either keeps close records of professionals' time
or could readily do so. That being so, law firms control the in-
formation necessary to render separate bills for each profes-
sional, and do not need to "share" fees. Nothing would prohibit
a firm composed of lawyers together with accountants or social
workers or members of other professions, from sharing rent,
the cost of computers, or the cost of paraprofessionals and jun-
ior associates. Each member of the firm can have a monthly
draw in the form of salary, which is not fee sharing. Annual
adjustments to distribute profits would be fee sharing if the
transaction is characterized in that way. On the other hand, if
the division to the nonlawyers is defined as a bonus on top of
salary rather than a sharing of profits, then it is seems to me
the distribution is not a violation of Rule 5.4.
However, this approach to division of revenues entails two
problems. One problem is that in a disciplinary proceeding the
form of the transactions might be disregarded. The other risk
is probably more serious as a practical matter. Put very sim-
ply, it may be difficult for a multidisciplinary firm to attract
top-level nonlawyer professionals who cannot be made partners
and who therefore would be "second-class citizens" in the firm.
I understand that this was the underlying problem that led the
District of Columbia to permit formation of multidisciplinary
firms.
The other problem, and probably a tougher one, arises from
Rule 1.10, which has to do with imputation of conflicts. Rule
1.10 operates this way: If Larry Fox and I are in a law firm to-
gether, any conflict of interest that he would have is imputed to
me. Thus, if I am considering taking on a new client, I have to
take account of the interests of Larry's clients because any con-
flict of interest that he would have in the new undertaking will
be imputed to me, and vice versa. The rule applies not only if
[Vol. 84:10831088
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Larry and I are side-by-side in our office, but also if he is in one
of the other offices of our law firm, say the one in Philadelphia,
and I am in Harrisburg or Minneapolis or, indeed, in London.
Therefore, if our firm gets to a size beyond two or three attor-
neys, we have to have a computerized conflicts system into
which he feeds all his information about his clients and I do the
same thing. The computer system does a continual matchup of
clients and matters. We also have a procedure for discussing
problematic cases because we both realize, as a result of expe-
rience, that you cannot rely simply on a computer.
Law firms are able to operate under this regime. In fact,
some law firms have managed to grow quite large while still
adhering to Rule 1.10. A number of law firms are colonizing
around the globe. Of course, occasionally law firms get cross-
wise in their clientele resulting in embarrassment and some-
timds in motions to disqualify, but for the most part the firms
live with Rule 1.10 and function satisfactorily.
Complications would arise if Rule 1.10 were applied to a
multidisciplinary firm. For one thing, the rule of imputation is
peculiar to the practice of law. Other professions and vocations
do not have such a rule. Rather, they recognize the concept of
"insulation," whereby professionals working in one firm can
provide service to clients with conflicting interests so long as
the specific professionals involved do not share information
concerning the clients involved. Some lawyers recoil in horror
at this idea, but accountants and financial managers see noth-
ing wrong with it. Perhaps they regard each other as more
trustworthy in maintaining confidentiality than do lawyers. In
any event, it may be noted that the prohibition in Rule 1.10(a)
frames the imputation of conflicts as absolutely critical inside
law firms.
My own view is that the bar could have a satisfactory rule
permitting insulation walls, but many strongly disagree. In
fact, in England, there are little cells of offices in the Inns of
Court where barristers who are directly confronting each other
in court live cheek by jowl in their chambers. The barristers
are all solo practitioners, and the same clerk may handle the
work for three or four barristers. In this country, public de-
fender offices in some jurisdictions have a similar situation. To
reduce the scope of imputed conflicts among lawyers in the de-
fender offices, they establish insulation walls between the of-
fices and prohibit lawyers in one unit from looking at the files
and conferring with lawyers in another unit. These arrange-
2000 FOREWORD 1089
HeinOnline -- 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1089 1999-2000
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ments have held up in court. As these examples suggest, there
are clearly feasible alternatives to Rule 1.10.
Strictly interpreted, Rule 1.10 would not prohibit a lawyer
in a firm from undertaking a representation simply because it
is adverse to the client of an accountant who is a member of the
same firm. There is reason to think that disciplinary authori-
ties might disregard the terms of the rule, or fall back on the
obsolete concept of "appearance of impropriety." There is also
risk that the fact that the firm itself will get some revenue from
the accountant's client would be counted as an "interest" on the
part of the lawyer. On that basis-the prospect of the lawyer
sharing some of the accountant's revenue-the lawyer could be
said to have a conflict of interest. Interpretations such as these
strike me as far-fetched, but disciplinary authorities and courts
have often been willing to disregard the rules of law in defer-
ence to the supposed higher needs of the profession. They could
do so again.
II. EXPANDING THE LEGAL TENT
Returning to the current state of law and the MDP debate,
I will focus on those lawyers who are not lawyers. I refer to
lawyers who use their technical legal knowledge as staff mem-
bers of accounting firms, financial service firms, banks, insur-
ance companies, universities and hospitals, among other em-
ployers. The stated objection is that lawyers in such setting are
under uncontrollable pressure to submit to unprofessional di-
rection from superiors who are not lawyers. The idea of a law-
yer being engaged in a setting in which he is very beholden to
somebody not a lawyer is not, however, unheard of. In fact,
this situation is precisely the role of in-house counsel. When I
entered the law practice forty years ago, in-house lawyers were
regarded as second-class professionals, if indeed they were con-
sidered professionals at all. They were the unfit who had been
unable to make it in the big firms. Today, in-house counsel are
very differently regarded, for these lawyers are now the ones
who employ outside counsel. Accordingly, those of us in inde-
pendent law practice have learned that those who used to be
fallen brethren are now our esteemed colleagues.
Of course there was, and is, a risk that in-house lawyers-
the corporate general counsel and her staff-will be under the
thumb of the CEO or other members of corporate management.
But it is also recognized that in-house lawyers have a positive
counter-influence on corporate management. Today it is com-
1090 [Vol. 84:1083
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monly accepted that in-house counsel is a real lawyer, some-
body who goes to the bar association meetings, goes to CLE
programs, is socialized into our profession, thinks of himself as
a lawyer and, by golly, is a lawyer. Thus, although these men
and women work for a single employer, they have come out
from under the shadow and are a legitimate part of our profes-
sion.
An additional example of lawyers working for nonlawyers
are those who are in small firms that do insurance defense
work for a single insurance company. There is a legitimate ar-
gument that these "captive" firms are improper under the rules
as they stand. But in many states it is perfectly legitimate for
these lawyers to be employees of the insurance company and to
have professional managers worry about managing the office.
Perhaps even more to the point in terms of "realist" analysis, it
is perfectly legitimate today for lawyers to be organized as a
separate law firm called Smith & Jones, even though ninety
percent of their business comes from two insurance companies.
Will lawyers so situated be too sensitive to those insurance
companies' interests, to the disadvantage of the interests of the
insureds? Is there a risk that the lawyers might overlook their
professional responsibilities to the insureds as clients? Of
course there is. Are such arrangements nevertheless permitted
on the premise that by and large the lawyers will recognize the
proper priorities in their responsibilities? Of course they are.
Lawyers in these insurance company engagements can
have difficult ethical problems when they get a client who has a
coverage problem. The result obviously can be a conflict of in-
terest with the company. But the lawyers can work it out.
Doing so may be difficult, but that difficulty does not delegiti-
mate the activity they are engaged in. The role of insurance
defense counsel is just another example of an attorney forced to
take suitable account of the interests of somebody who is not
the lawyer's client and who has a very strong economic position
vis-a-vis the attorney.
In recent years I have had an experience dealing with a
very complicated problem in estate planning involving both
lawyers and insurance analysts as consultants. There were
two or three independent lawyers, as well as the financial con-
sultant and an in-house lawyer for the insurance company. It
required the knowledge and judgment of all of these profes-
sionals to figure out how best to address the situation. The fi-
20001 1091
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nancial consultant and in-house lawyer were critical to the pro-
cess.
In my observation, attorneys on the staff of insurance com-
panies, trust companies, and accounting firms, for example, are
in a position to bring very useful information and skill to reso-
lution of very real client problems. Their usefulness increases
as legal knowledge and technique get more and more special-
ized and underlying transactions get more distinct. A pension
fund linked to General Motors is not the same as a pension
fund linked to General Mills, for example. If a General Motors
employee needs financial planning, it helps if the advisers in-
volved are familiar with the specifics of the General Motors
pension fund, rather than recently having had a course in pen-
sion law. The same proposition holds for healthcare coverages,
whether from the point of view of the patient or the doctors or
the healthcare institution. These kinds of arrangements are
often bewildering in their complexity and they are getting more
complicated. The only way anybody can really understand
them is to learn by experience. Yet, as things stand, the bar
wants to say that the lawyers who understand these arrange-
ments are not really lawyers.
I estimate that probably thirty percent of our law school
graduates end up in various staff positions of the kind I have
described. This leaves about one-third of our profession in
these settings where they cannot call themselves lawyers. The
reason they cannot call themselves lawyers is because they are
employed by corporations. If they call themselves lawyers,
then they would be assisting the corporation in the unauthor-
ized practice of law. So they call themselves tax advisors, per-
sonnel directors, or part of a law department that is repre-
senting only the employer.
III. CORE VALUES AND A VISION FOR THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
In the MDP debate, there has been a lot of talk about the
core values of our profession. However, we have to consider not
only the values we profess, but the values we exhibit in prac-
tice. My experience in litigation suggests to me that, for many
lawyers, the core values of our profession include being as
nasty as we can be. We can smile at each other at the bar asso-
ciation meeting, but many of us behave very differently in the
deposition room. I now make it a practice after I have been
subjected to a deposition that has been conducted in a civilized
1092 [Vol. 84:1083
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way to say to the lawyer who took it, "Thank you, sir, very pro-
fessional." The reason for conferring this recognition of course
is that I have also been subjected to many depositions that are
unprofessional.
But what are the positive values? Confidentiality, to be
sure. But do we not think that accountants recognize and ob-
serve confidentiality as a professional virtue? Of course they
do. Indeed, accountants are subject to a legal duty of confiden-
tiality derived from the law of agency. How about financial ad-
visors? Do they not consider confidentiality an ethical and le-
gal duty? Loyalty. Do not accountants and financial advisors
have ethical and legal duties of loyalty? Do they not have a
duty, as we have, to consider the matter at hand in terms of the
client's viewpoint and objectives? Of course they do. Compe-
tence. Do our fellow professionals not have a duty to use com-
petence in their engagements, and to decline and refer to other
matters that are beyond their competence? Of course they do.
All these ethical duties are supported by the law of agency and
the law governing fiduciaries.
CONCLUSION: WHERE COULD WE GO FROM HERE?
If we wanted to be serious about restoring the profession to
what we imagine it used to be, we could adopt the following
ethical restrictions. You can call yourself a lawyer only if-
* You do not engage in any other economic activity ex-
cept that of collecting revenues from passive invest-
ments. Other activities in which lawyers have en-
gaged-real estate investments, corporate director-
ships, etc.-all dilute and confuse professional iden-
tity.
* You do not make public utterances on the subject
matter you are presently handling for clients. We are
spokespersons in court and we have no business be-
ing spokespersons on the courthouse steps. Being a
special spokesmen in court is a very important privi-
lege, and its distinctive character should be pre-
served. A lawyer should not become a general
mouthpiece for a client.
* You have professional malpractice insurance in a
very substantial amount, say a factor of several times
the annual revenues per lawyer. Lawyers are sup-
posed to be responsible and real responsibility entails
being financially answerable for one's conduct. Some
20001 FOREWORD 1093
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say that is impossible. In fact, malpractice insurance
is already required in Oregon, and perhaps in a few
other states.
0 You have an accounting system that meets recog-
nized accounting standards. Many law firms, par-
ticularly small firms, do not handle the money very
well. Not everyone would be required to have the
same system, but it must be a system that meets the
professional accounting standards.
0 You have an operative conflicts-checking system. All
responsible law firms now have such systems.
0 You are continuously subject to unannounced audits
of your accounting and conflicts-checking systems.
The disciplinary authorities would be authorized to
come in anytime without warning and take a look.
They are doing something like that in Iowa, and they
have been doing it for years in British Columbia.
* You have periodic peer-review evaluations. To avoid
conflicts problems it would be necessary to have these
reviews done by lawyers from "out of town." Surely
the rules could be arranged to make it feasible to
have such reviews.
These are the kinds of things we should address if we
really got serious about the values of the profession. Under
such a regime the profession would be narrowly-defined. It
would mean that people could not call themselves lawyers un-
less they conformed to these standards. There would be lots of
people out there who are lawyers, who are trained lawyers, who
are doing law functions, but could not call themselves lawyers.
That would be their choice. A model quite similar to what I
propose is currently the law in Sweden, and they seem to be
surviving very nicely.
The possibility that such a model would be adopted in this
country is of course remote, probably infinitesimal. An alterna-
tive is to step back and take a broader view of the function of
law in our modern society. From that perspective we can see
how pervasive legal intervention has become in the ordinary af-
fairs of the community-environment, employment, tax, securi-
ties, health, education, etc. We could also recognize how di-
verse the mechanisms for providing legal services have become.
On one end are the thousand-member international corporate
law firms, nearly unthinkable even twenty years ago and
bearing only nominal resemblance to the traditional law firm.
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On the other end of the spectrum is the county attorney legal
staff cooperating with family services social workers to provide
guidance and assistance to the poor people in the locality.
There is an infinite array between these variations.
We could consider that everyone is still a "lawyer" who has
gone to law school and is now not in some distinct calling. I
would like to see all these folks brought back into the profes-
sion by making it easy for them to call themselves lawyers,
even if they are employed by corporations, even if they are
working with accountants or whatever. I am very pessimistic
about the possibility that the bar can bring itself to do that.
The speeches at the bar meetings suggest that the sky would
fall if we did. But at least we could avoid making the situation
worse. Hence, the feasible and prudent course would be to
leave the rules as they stand unchanged.
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